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The Role of the States in Combating Managed
Care Fraud and Abuse
by Joan H. Krause*
INTRODUCTION

The recent growth of managed care cost containment strate
gies has attracted a great deal of attention to the issues of qual
ity of, and access to, health care services. Many concerns have
focused on the potential effects of an increasingly cost-conscious
health care system on the traditional physician-patient relation
ship, patient treatment choices, and broader issues of patient
rights. These concerns have in tum fueled a so-called "back
lash" against managed care, resulting in a growing number of
laws and initiatives designed to prohibit what are perceived as
particularly egregious activities undertaken by managed care
organizations. 1
Although the quest for adequate patient protections is likely
to continue, the focus of governmental investigations into man
aged care has begun to shift. Recognizing that a significant por
tion of the United States population now receives its health care
through managed care organizations (and that a significant por
tion of health care reimbursement now flows to such entities),
the federal and state governments have begun to investigate
whether these organizations are in fact delivering what is being
paid for - and whether the failure to do so constitutes health
care fraud. At the federal level, for example, the Department of
Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General's
("OIG's") 1999 Work Plan includes several initiatives designed
to assess both the activities of and the reimbursement paid to
managed care organizations under the Medicare and Medicaid
programs.2 Similarly, officials in many states have announced a
* Assistant Professor of Law, Institute for Health Law, Loyola University of Chi
cago School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash,
HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 1998, at 82, 83. See also Louise G. Trubek, Informing, Claim
ing, Contracting: Enforcement in the Managed Care Era, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 133
(1999).
2. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN
ERAL, WORK PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 1999: HEALTH CARE FINANCING AnMINISTRA179
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centralized, multi-level attack on managed care fraud in both
the public and private sectors.3
This Article will focus on the weapons wielded by state regu
lators in the fight against managed care fraud. Though recent
discussions of health care fraud have concentrated on federal ef
forts, this Article will argue that it is the states, using a variety of
legal theories, that have the most flexibility to address fraudu
lent managed care practices. This flexibility, in tum, allows state
regulators to craft penalties and structure settlements that are
tailored to the specific misconduct at issue. These precisely
targeted anti-fraud efforts, in contrast to some of the broader
federal provisions, may allow state regulators to resolve
problems more efficiently, with fewer interruptions in patient
access to care - thus benefitting the patient population the laws
were designed to protect.
I.

FRAUD IN MANAGED CARE

For most of this century, health care in the United States was
provided on a fee-for-service basis. Under this system, physi
cians charged for medical care on a per-service basis, such as the
amount of time spent with the patient or the procedures per
formed. Until the Great Depression, patients generally paid
these charges directly out of their own pockets, and physician
charges, by necessity, were limited by the amount of money pa
tients could afford to pay.4 In response to problems faced dur
ing the Depression by physicians and hospitals with an
increasingly cash-strapped patient base, the concept of health
"insurance" was developed.. Initially, such insurance was of
fered on an "indemp.ity" basis: the physician's bill was paid by
the patient, who later was reimbursed by the insurer for a pre
set portion of the expenses. Over time, insurance was also of
fered on a "service" basis, under which the physician received
TION PROJECTS 22-27, (visited Feb. 21, 1998) <http://www.dhhs.gov/progorg/oig/
wrkpln/1999/99hcfawp.pdf>.
3. See, e.g., New York: New Bureau for Health Care Issues Set Up By Attorney
General's Office, BNA's HEALTH L. REP., May 8, 1997, at 19 (describing new bureau
created by Attorney General Dennis C. Vacco, whose duties would include investiga
tion of certain HMO practices).
4. See Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What its Effect Would
Be On American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1339, 1358-59
(1994); MARC A. RoowIN, MEDICINE, MoNEY, AND MoRALS: PHYSICIANS' CON
FLICTS OF INTEREST 3 (1993).
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payment directly from the insurer under a predetermined fee
schedule.5
Clearly, the fee-for-service system created an economic con
flict of interest for the physician, since "[t]he more services the
doctor provided, the greater was his income."6 Physicians thus
had a financial incentive to overtreat their patients in an attempt
to boost their own incomes, most commonly by ordering serv
ices that the patient did not actually need. Unfortunately, the
growth of health insurance only exacerbated this temptation.
Once payment for the bulk of treatment costs was supplied by a
"deep pocket" insurance company, both physicians and patients
were insulated from their previous budgetary limits, and pa
tients' financial constraints no longer operated as a check on
physician charges. 7 Eventually, virtually unlimited third-party
reimbursement was accompanied by the rapid development and
diffusion of highly advanced (and highly expensive) medical
technologies, as well as a rapidly aging patient population leading to a rapid increase in health care expenditures.8 While
health care made up only five percent of the Gross National
Product in_ 1950, it reached twelve percent in the early 1990s,
and is predicted to grow to fifteen percent by the year 2000.9
In response to the escalating cost of health care, the largest
health care payers - primarily businesses and the federal and
state governments - increasingly have turned to mechanisms
designed to contain health care costs. The primary cost contain
ment strategy has been to replace providers' traditional incen
tives to maximize the volume of services provided with
incentives designed to do the opposite - generally by putting
physicians at "financial risk" for the costs of services they pro
vide or initiate.10 The use of such incentives commonly is re
ferred to as "managed care," and the entities adopting such
5. See Alexander M. Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical and Legal
Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 708, 712 (1986).
6. See Rodwin, supra note 4, at 2.
7. See id. at 14.
8. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, BALANCING Acr: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF
MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICS 9-13 (1995).
9. See E. Haavi Morreim, Economic Disclosure and Economic Advocacy: New
Duties in the Medical Standard of Care, 12 J. LEG. MEo. 275, 280-81 (1991).
10. See E. Haavi Morreim, Diverse and Perverse Incentives of Managed Care:
Bringing Patients Into Alignment, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 89-90 (1996); Barry R. Fur
row, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L.
REv. 419, 429-30 (1997).

182

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 8

constraints are known as "managed care organizations"
("MCOs").11 The primary method by which MCOs shift finan
cial risk to physicians is through "capitation," whereby the
MCO pays a single fee to the physician for providing complete
care to an enrollee for a set period of time. The physician re
ceives the same amount of money for each enrollee regardless
of how many services are actually provided; because payment
for additional services comes directly out of the physician's
pocket, capitation removes the physician's incentive to order un
necessary services. 12
Conceptually, managed care organizations both provide serv
ices to patients through contracted health care providers, and
administer the provision of such services. Because of the sheer
number of individuals and entities involved, and the variety of
financial relationships that exist among them, both MCOs and
their contracted providers have opportunities to engage in a
wide variety of improper activities related to the delivery of
health care. 13 For example, MCOs may defraud their contracted
providers by delaying payment or refusing to pay for previously
approved services, and may defraud employers or government
11. In its most restrictive form, "managed care" can refer solely to health mainte
nance organizations ("HMOs"), which offer a wide range of health care services at a
fixed price in return for limiting enrollees to a defined network of health care provid
ers and employing strict utilization guidelines and referral restrictions. More broadly,
however, "managed care" may be used to refer to any type of health insurance plan
that utilizes any type of cost containment mechanism, such as requiring approval
before patients are hospitalized for elective surgery. Thus, many so-called "managed
care" strategies have been adopted by traditional insurers as well. See Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 1362 (noting many fee-for-service plans are now subject to cost con
tainment mechanisms, such as utilization review).
12. See, e.g., Morreim, ''Diverse and Perverse Incentives," supra note 10, at 91;
David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit
Care, 30 U. R1ctt. L. REv. 155, 158-59 (1996). Many MCOs also have adopted "bo
nus" or "withhold" systems, in which pools of funds are set aside to cover the costs of
certain. types of ancillary services; any funds remaining in the pool at the end of the
year are distributed. to the physicians. See id. at 159-60.
13. See, e.g., Sharon L. Davies & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care: Placebo
or Wonder Drug for Health Care Fraud and Abuse? 31 GA. L. REv. 373, 385-93
(1997); Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and
Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455,
491 (1994) (questioning whether managed care cost savings "are eliminating waste or
merely eliminating access to needed services"); Alan Bloom & Charles B. Oppen
heimer, Fraud in Managed Care: Old Wine in New Bottles, 18 WHITIIER L. REv. 13
(1996). It is important to recognize that fraud may be perpetrated both by the MCO
(e.g., when fraudulent charges are submitted to payers) and on the MCO (e.g., when
contracted providers inflate their charges to the MCO). See, e.g., Gabriel Imperato
& Jennifer Steward, Perspectives: Managed Care Plans Are Victims, Perpetrators of
Fraud & Abuse, MANAGED CARE WK., Mar. 3, 1997, at *l.
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payers by submitting false or fraudulent data to obtain
payment. 14
Moreover, to the extent that many MCOs do not operate
solely under capitation, but continue to reimburse for certain
types of services on a fee-for-service basis, all of the traditional
incentives for overutilization - and thus for overtreatment,
kickbacks, and self-referral practices - continue to flourish. 15
On the other hand, while capitation clearly minimizes the overu
tilization of services, it may also create incentives to do the re
verse: to underutilize services, thereby reducing the cost of care
provided to patients. MCOs can achieve this result by explicitly
denying coverage for expensive services, a tactic that may lead
to protracted court battles with unhappy enrollees. But MCOs
also may adopt more subtle approaches, such as imposing long
delays before appointments can be scheduled or locating physi
cian offices in inconvenient locations - making it difficult for
patients to access the services to which they are entitled. 16
Similarly, MCOs have an incentive to enroll the healthiest
(and thus least costly) patients. Clearly, MCOs could accom
plish this overtly, by declining to enroll sick patients or pressur
ing patients who become severely ill to disenroll from the
organization. Again, however, MCOs may achieve a similar re
sult more subtly by directing their marketing activities toward
healthier individuals, such as by distributing brochures at health
clubs, or holding informational sessions in locations that are not
handicapped accessible. 17 Other reported marketing improprie
ties have included overly aggressive recruitment tactics (particu
larly involving the Medicaid population), misrepresentations
regarding the scope of services covered or the patient's cost
sharing portion, and enrolling fictitious patients in the MCO. In
perhaps the most egregious cases, MCOs have been accused of
enrolling actual patients without their knowledge. 18
As this brief listing indicates, the opportunities for improper
activities in the managed care context are myriad. Depending
on the applicable regulatory structure, these activities may be
actionable at the state level under a variety of legal theories,
14. See Davies & Jost, supra note 13, at 391-93.
15. See id. at 391.
16. See id. at 385-87.
17. See, e.g., Patricia Neuman et al., Marketing HMOs to Medicare Beneficiaries:
Do Medicare HMOs Target Healthy Seniors?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 1997, at
132, 135-36.
18. See Davies & Jost, supra note 13, at 387-91.
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including: (1) traditional anti-fraud laws; (2) violation of appli
cable insurance laws and regulations; and (3) laws designed to
protect consumers from unfair trade practices.
IL

STATE RESPONSES TO MANAGED
THREE MODELS

CARE FRAUD:

A. Traditional "Fraud and Abuse" Protections
Both the federal and state governments have enacted a vari
ety of criminal, civil and administrative provisions to prohibit
health care fraud, predominantly in the fee-for-service context.
At the federal level, the most important anti-fraud laws include
the Civil and Criminal False Claims Acts, the Medicare and
Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute, and broad administrative civil
monetary penalty and exclusion authorities. 19 States have en
acted a similarly broad range of anti-fraud legislation, often
modeled on comparable federal provisions, targeting false
claims, fee splitting and kickbacks in connection with both pub
lic programs and privately .funded health care.20 Under these
provisions, violators may be subject to significant criminal fines
and civil penalties, imprisonment, ineligibility for participation
in certain government-sponsored programs, and professional
discipline (including suspension or revocation of a professional
license). 21
To the extent that an MCO continues to make payments on a
fee-for-service basis, such as by "carving out" certain types of
services or paying specialists pursuant to a fee schedule rather
than as part of the capitated rate, these anti-fraud laws should
19. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1998) (civil false claims); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1998) (crimi
nal false claims); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1998) (Medicare and Medicaid fraud and anti
kickback laws); 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7a (civil monetary penalties); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7
(1998) (exclusion).
20. See, e.g., RI. GEN. LAWS§§ 5-48.1-1, 5-48.1-3 (West 1998) (all-payor anti-kick
back prohibition); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 400.604 (Medicaid false claims),
752.1004 (health care false claims) (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.091(l)(p)
(West 1998) (fee splitting constitutes grounds for disciplinary action against physi
cian); ALA. ConE § 22-1-ll(b) (1998) (Medicaid anti-kickback prohibition); Georgia
Medicaid Fraud Forfeiture Act, GA. CooE ANN. § 49-4-146.1-3 (1998).
21. A recent New Jersey law combines several of these approaches, explicitly list
ing violation of the health care claims fraud statute as one of the grounds for revoca
tion of a health care practitioner's license. See 1997 N.J. SEss. LAW SERV. ch. 353
(West). Some officials also have sought to extend the authority of the state Medicaid
Fraud Control Units to investigate fraud in other sectors of federal and private health
care programs. See, e.g., S. 2040, 105TH CoNG. (1998); Medicaid: Massachusetts At
torney General Seeks Waiver to Expand Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Jurisdiction, 3
BNA's HEALTH L. REP., Sept. 1, 1994, at 35.
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apply to managed care in the same way they apply to traditional
health care. 22 With regard to other types of MCO activities,
however, the application of these laws is less clear. For example,
under capitation, a primary care physician receives a pre-set fee
to provide care to an enrollee for a particular period of time;
unlike under traditional insurance, no claims for specific services
need be submitted in order to receive payment. While "encoun
ter data" may be requested from the physician, it is used primar
ily for statistical rather than for reimbursement purposes. Thus,
if the physician fails to provide required services or misstates the
nature of services provided, it may be difficult to identify any
"claim" that has been submitted for payment, as may be re
quired for the purposes of false claims or false statements liabil
ity. 23 Clearly, traditional anti-fraud provisions may not
adequately protect against all forms of managed care fraud.
While commentators have called for revision of existing laws
to explicitly define common managed care activities as actiona
ble fraud and abuse, little progress appears to have been made
at the state level.24 At present, only the expanding use of
mandatory managed care for the Medicaid population has gen
erated sufficient concern to warrant the enactment of new crimi
nal laws. For example, a recent New Mexico law criminalizes a
variety of improper activities involving Medicaid managed care,
including furnishing treatment that is "substantially inadequate"
with intent that a "claim" ( defined broadly as any communica
tion identifying a treatment, item, or service as reimbursable) be
relied upon to expend public money.25 But to the extent that
traditional anti-fraud laws have not been amended ( or inter
preted through case law) to explicitly prohibit similar activities,
they will remain of limited use in addressing non-traditional
forms of fraud and abuse in managed care.
22. See Davies & Jost, supra note 13, at 390-92.
23. See id. at 396-97 (describing problems with current criminal sanctions). De
spite these problems, federal prosecutors have made clear their intention to address
underutilization through application of the False Claims Act. See, e.g., Mary DuBois
Krohn, Comment, The False Claims Act and Managed Care: Blowing the Whistle on
Underutilization, 28 CuMB. L. REv. 443, 456-72 (1998); Fraud: Underutilization in
Managed Care New Target of Joint Fraud Efforts, 4 BNA's HEALTH L. REP., Dec. 7,
1995, at 47 (discussing formation of Department of Justice Managed Care and Fraud
Working Group).
24. See, e.g., Davies & Jost, supra note 13, at 411-12 (recommending that current
laws be amended to explicitly state that submission of false encounter data constitutes
a false statement).
25. 1997 N.M. LAws ch. 98, § 1 (adding N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-44-2(B), 30-447A(2)(b) (Michie 1998)).
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B. Regulation of the Insurance Industry
Rather than relying on traditional "fraud and abuse" laws,
many states have made efforts to address MCO activities under
the insurance regulatory structure. As both insurers and provid
ers of health care, MCOs are regulated by state laws requiring
licensure both for health care entities (e.g., HMOs), and for un
dertaking certain types of common managed care activities (e.g.,
utilization review).26 In most states, HMOs must comply with
requirements generally applicable to all licensed health insurers,
as well as with traditional HMO-centered provisions (including
recent legislation specifically targeting perceived abuses within
the managed care industry). Rather than criminal or other
traditional types of fraud prosecutions, MCOs increasingly face
investigations and administrative proceedings for failure to com
ply with these licensure requirements - an approach that may
offer advantages for state officials.
For example, MCOs are subject to a host of administrative
requirements regarding the business of insurance, including laws
regulating the content and sale of insurance policy forms.27 An
increasingly common requirement is that insurers create internal
programs designed to identify fraudulent practices. In Califor
nia, for example, insurance carriers have been required by regu
lation for several years to establish "Special Investigative Units"
to detect and investigate suspected fraudulent claims, train
claims handlers to identify possible fraudulent claims, and facili
tate reporting of fraudulent claims to state regulators.28 Similar
requirements now exist in almost half of the states, and regula
tors have begun to enforce these laws against non-compliant in
surers and MCOs alike.29
26. See, e.g., TEX. INs. CODE ANN. ch. 20A (HMO Act), art. 21.58A (utilization
review) (West 1998).
27. See, e.g., Plan Regulation: Colorado Regulators Fine Kaiser For Various Policy
Form Violations (hereinafter "Kaiser"), 4 BNA's MANAGED. CARE REP., Sept. 16,
1998, at 912, 913 (describing fines imposed on Kaiser and several of its competitors
under recently enacted health insurance reform laws).
28. See CAL. CoDE REos. tit. 10, § 2698.40 (1998). Recent legislation imposed
similar anti-fraud requirements on HMOs. See CAi. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348
(West 1998) (requiring each health care service plan to establish an anti-fraud plan,
refer suspected fraud cases to a law enforcement agency, and submit an annual report
to the Insurance Commissioner).
29. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REos. tit. 11, § 86.6 (1998) (requiring insur
ers to develop fraud prevention plans); State Takes Action Against Insurers That Do
Not Have Anti-Fraud Programs, 2 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., July 1, 1998, at
488; Kirk J. Nahra, MCOs Need to Adopt New Mindset to Pursue Anti-Fraud Activity,
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MCOs are also required to comply with state provisions regu
lating the payment of insurance claims. These laws and regula
tions often include "prompt payment" requirements, which
mandate that "clean" claims (i.e., complete claims without any
defects) be paid within a certain time period after receipt.30 Re
cently, several MCOs in New York were accused of violating
these requirements, and ultimately entered into negotiations
with state regulators to resolve the allegations. 31 Similarly,
Maryland regulators recently prevented an HMO from recoup
ing overpayments to doctors in violation of a 1997 law that lim
ited such "retroactive denials" to six-months after payment. 32
Moreover, the recent "backlash" against managed care has fu
eled a variety of legislative and enforcement initiatives designed
to prohibit what are perceived as particularly egregious MCO
activities.33 Among the more popular initiatives are laws
prohibiting MCOs from using financial incentives that induce
physicians to limit "medically necessary" care,34 imposing con
tractual "gag clauses" that restrict physician communications
with patients,35 and denying payment for emergency care fur2 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP.,June 17,1998,at 456,457 (describing efforts in
New York and New Jersey).
30. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 3224-a (McKinney 1998) (requiring insurers to pay
claims within 45 days of receipt); N.J. AoMIN. CooE tit. 8, § 8:38-16.1 (1998} (requir
ing HMOs to pay clean claims within 60 calendar days of receipt).
31. See, e.g., Claims Administration: New York Attorney General Seeks Talks On
Aetna U.S. Healthcare Payment Delays, 4 BNA's MANAGED CARE REP., Aug. 12,
1998,at 814 (describing attorney general's negotiations with Aetna,as well as a previ
ous settlement with Oxford Health Plans, Inc. involving similar allegations).
32. See Mo. CooE ANN., INS. § 15-1008 (1998) (retroactive denial of reimburse
ment); MAMSI Ordered to Comply Again with Maryland Claims Payment Law, 2
BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., Aug. 12, 1998, at 605.
33. See, e.g., Blendon et al., supra note 1, at 82; States Setting Detailed Quality
Standards Rather Than "Legislating By Body Part," 7 BNA's HEALTH L. REP.,July 2,
1998, at 1059 (noting that more than half of all states considered bills in the first half
of 1998 to regulate MCO quality of care).
34. See D. Ward Pimley, States Tell Health Plans That Incentives May Not Limit
Medically Necessary Care, 4 BNA's MANAGED CARE REP.,Oct. 14,1998, at 1030-31
(at least 21 states have addressed this issue). However, there is little guidance re
garding exactly which types of incentives will fall within these prohibitions. See, e.g.,
Insurance Commissioner Abandons Plan For HMO Financial Incentive Guidelines, 2
BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP.,Nov. 18,1998,at 882 (describing failed effort to
formulate guidance regarding TEX. INS. CooE ANN. § 20A.14(/) (West 1998)).
35. See, e.g., GA. CooE ANN.§ 33-20A-7 (1998) ("No health care provider may be
penalized for discussing medically necessary or appropriate care with or on behalf of
his or her patient."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.71(1}(1} (West 1998} (prohibiting "any
agreement or directive that prohibits a health care provider from communicating with
an enrollee with respect to the enrollee's health status,health care, or treatment op
tions"). A number of statutes also prohibit health plans from penalizing providers
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nished in out-of-network hospitals,36 as well as laws mandating
coverage of specific benefits or the services of specific types of
health care professionals.37 Thus, in addition to long-standing
licensure requirements, MCOs must now comply with an in
creasing number of new managed care-specific provisions.
The ability to pursue MCO activities as a violation of relevant
insurance requirements, rather than as criminal or civil "fraud,"
offers some advantages to state regulators.38 In contrast to po
tential imprisonment, exclusion and the extensive fines and pen
alties that can be imposed under traditional fraud and abuse
laws, violations of state insurance provisions traditionally have
been addressed through lesser fines, cease and desist orders, and
injunctive relief. More serious penalties, including license revo
cation and suspension, usually are imposed only for repeated vi
olations or otherwise egregious practices.39
In addition, the detailed nature of insurance requirements
may make it easier to identify the steps that must be taken by
who advocate on behalf of their patients. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 991.2113(c)(l).
36. See, e.g., Vickie Yates Brown & Barbara Reid Hartung, Managed Care at the
Crossroads: Can Managed Care Organizations Survive Government Regulation?, 7
ANNALS HEALTH L. 25, 40-41 (1998); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.4(c)
(West 1998) (requiring payment for emergency services unless enrollee "reasonably
should have known" that it was not an emergency); State's Suit Against Kai.ser Alleges
Emergency Care Claims Denied, Delayed, 2 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., July
29, 1998, at 561 (describing Texas v. Kaiser Found. Health Plans, No. 9807419 (Tex.
Dist. Ct., filed July 13, 1998)).
37. See Brown & Hartung, supra note 36, at 33-35 (describing state mandated ben
efits laws), 36-40 (describing "any willing provider" laws that force MCOs to contract
with any provider willing to accept the MCO's terms).
38. For a description of recent state "anti-fraud" efforts centering on MCO fail
ures to comply with relevant regulatory provisions, see Kristen Hallam & Chris
Rauber, Fraud Probes Target HMOs: States Attack Plans for False Marketing, Care
Denials, Moo. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 14, 1998, at 22 (describing MCO fraud probes in
California, New York, and South Carolina, alleging that HMOs have used misleading
marketing materials, improperly denied enrollees access to mental health profession
als, improperly delayed claims payment, and engaged in improper enrollment and
disenrollment activities).
39. For example, the Texas Insurance Code provides for revocation of an insurer's
license for violations of (or failure to comply with) the relevant laws, rules or regula
tions. In lieu of revocation, the Commissioner may: (1) suspend a license for not
more than one year; (2) enter a cease and desist order; (3) impose an administrative
penalty (generally not to exceed $25,000); or (4) require the violator to make restitu
tion. See T Ex. INS. CooE ANN. art. 1.10(7), 1.10A (cease and desist orders), 1.lOE
(monetary penalties) (West 1998). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2S-16, 26:2S-24
(West 1998) (imposing civil penalties, license suspension or revocation, cease and de
sist orders, and/or injunctive relief against licensed insurer or MCO that violates anti
gag clause law).
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the MCO to bring its activities into compliance.40 Where viola
tive activities can be identified and corrected, and past practices
can be remedied through restitution and the imposition of rea
sonable fines, interruption in the MCO's provision of services
should be minimal. Moreover, the ability to look to detailed in
surance requirements also makes it possible to craft settlements
carefully targeted to eliminating the problematic behavior,
rather than addressing improper conduct solely with the "blunt
edged sword" of large financial penalties or exclusion from gov
ernment programs.41
C.

Consumer Protection

In addition to potentially violating state fraud and insurance
laws, improper MCO activities also may be construed as a
breach of the terms of the enrollment agreement (at least as
those terms were understood by the enrollee). By consistently
using a misleading enrollment agreement, or marketing policies
in an inappropriate manner, the MCO clearly may violate the
insurance provisions described above. To the extent that the
MCO's actions are misleading or improper only with respect to
an individual enrollee, that enrollee theoretically may have a vi
able cause of action against the MCO under a variety of legal
theories, including breach of contract42 and the torts of misrep
resentation, common law fraud, and bad faith breach of con
tract.43 As Professor Joanne Stem has noted:
40. See, e.g., Kaiser, supra note 27, at 912 (identifying specific deficiencies in Kai
ser's policies, such as inadequate disclosure of prostate screening availability and
overly restrictive definitions of certain terms).
41. For example, even prior to enactment of the New York prompt payment legis
lation, Oxford Health Plans settled allegations of claims delays by instituting a timely
payment schedule and agreeing to pay providers interest on delayed claims. See Ox
ford Agrees to Pay Providers Interest on Delayed Claims, Ending Investigation (herein
after "Oxford"), 3 BNA's MANAGED CARE REP., Aug. 6, 1997, at 753, 754.
42. See, e.g., McClellan v. Health Maint. Org., 604 A.2d 1053, 1061-62 (Pa. Super.
1992) (plaintiffs' allegations that MCO breached the subscriber contract, based on the
MCO's express representations regarding the competency of its physicians and access
to specialists, were sufficient to withstand a demurrer).
43. See, e.g., McEvoy v. Group Health Coop., 570 N.W.2d 397 (Wis. 1997) (hold
ing that the common law tort of bad faith applies to HMOs when they make decisions
regarding the coverage of out-of-network benefits). However, it may be difficult for
plaintiffs to succeed on these claims. See, e.g., Humana Hospital-Bayside v. Lightle,
407 S.E.2d 637 (S.C. 1991) (plaintiff unsuccessfully alleged negligence, fraud, bad faith
and estoppel against HMO for failure to pay claim for emergency services where
HMO was not notified of hospitalization within time period required by the sub
scriber contract); Kathy L. Cerminara, The Class Action Suit as a Method of Patient
Empowerment in the Managed Care Setting, 24 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 28-29 (1998)
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[C]ertain insurance cases have pointed to the consumer's mis
placed reliance on company slogans and advertisements prom
ising security ("a piece of the rock"), partiality and concern
("we're on your side"), and peace of mind ("you're in good
hands"). When the "good hands" drop you arbitrarily or you
discover that "your side" consistently is not their side, this may
lead to a tort action based on breach of the good faith cove
nant, as well as on fraud and misrepresentation. 44

However, plaintiffs often face significant legal obstacles m
challenging their MCOs.
In particular, where the patient is enrolled in the MCO
through an employee benefit plan, many of these causes of ac
tion may be preempted by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). 45 As one means of promoting
safety and uniformity in the administration of plans nationwide,
ERISA preempts state laws that "relate to any employee benefit
plan," with the exception of laws that regulate insurance, bank
ing, or securities. 46 Although primarily designed to protect em
ployees and their dependents, this broad "preemption clause"
has also been used as an affirmative defense by HMOs, who suc
cessfully have argued that tort and contract suits by patients
covered by employer-sponsored health benefit plans are pre
empted because such suits "relate to" the administration of the
health plan.47
Rather than relying on common law theories of tort and con
tract, patients and state regulators have begun to look to an(noting heavy burden of proof that plaintiffs must meet in order to prove common law
fraud claims).
44. Joanne B. Stem, Bad Faith Suits: Are They Applicable to Health Maintenance
Organizations?, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 911, 925 (1983).
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1998).
46. See id. § 1144(a), (b)(2)(A).
47. See, e.g., Toledo v. Kaiser Permanente Med. Group, 987 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D.
Cal. 1997) (plaintiffs' allegations of breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of
good faith, fraud, and infliction of emotional distress were preempted under ERISA);
Ryan v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 34, 37-38 (D. Mass. 1996)
(common law breach of contract claims are preempted by ERISA); McClellan, 604
A.2d at 1062 (although record was not sufficient to resolve the question, court noted
that if the defendant "is a valid ERISA employee benefit plan, it would appear that
the contract claims are preempted"); McManus v. Travelers Health Network, 742 F.
Supp. 377, 379-80 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (common law claims of breach of duty of good
faith and fair dealing are preempted under ERISA). But see HealthAmerica v. Men
ton, 551 So. 2d 235 (Ala. 1989) (ERISA does not preempt common law action for
fraud in the inducement because allegation that plaintiff relied on defendant's misrep
resentations in dropping his previous insurance and electing defendant's coverage
does not "relate to" an employee benefit plan).
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other source for protection: state consumer protection laws,
which generally prohibit "unfair methods of competition" and
"unfair or deceptive trade practices."48 Unlike more recent pro
visions enacted specifically to protect patients from specific
managed care activities, these laws protect patients as "consum
ers" in their "business" dealings with MCOs. The use of tradi
tional consumer protection statutes provides a number of
advantages for plaintiffs. From an advocacy perspective, MCO
enrollees' ability to use these laws situates their disputes
squarely within the rich tradition of consumer protection ac
tions, and may help to rally patients and legislators to fight for
the rights of health care patients.49 From a practical perspective,
these statutes are useful because they often permit private ac
tions by competitors or consumers who have been injured by the
unfair practice, in addition to permitting actions by the state at
torney general.50 Moreover, the penalties available under these
laws are extremely broad, including discontinuance of the im
proper practice, injunctive relief, restitution, civil penalties pay
able to the state, and dissolution of a business entity or loss of
the right to do business in the state (for repeated violations).
Additionally, double or treble damages, as well as costs and at
torney fees, are often available for private plaintiffs who can
prove certain wilful violations.51
Yet the road to consumer protection for patients has not been
a smooth one. Most consumer protection statutes apply only to
48. These laws are often based on the Federal Trade Commission Act or model
consumer protection statutes, such as the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Pro
tection Law, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, and the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. See Lee Ann Bundren, State Consumer Fraud Legislation Ap
plied to the Health Care Industry: Are Health Care Professionals Being "Consumed"?,
16 J. LEG. MED. 133, 134-36 (1995) (describing various models of consumer protec
tion); M1cHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CoNSUMER LAw: A GurnE FOR THOSE WHo REP
RESENT SELLERS, LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS 159-63 (1995).
49. See generally Cerminara, supra note 43, at 18-19 (describing relatively power
less status of patients in managed care, and the heightened need for consumerism).
However, not all patient rights advocates agree that consumerism is an acceptable
model. As Professor George Annas has argued, "We can call people who buy health
insurance consumers and people who join health plans members, but we must recog
nize that sick people who seek medical care are patients with rights that should be
protected." George J. Annas, A National Bill of Patients' Rights, 338 NEw ENGL. J.
MED. 695, 697 (1998).
50. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 4, 9, 11 (West 1998). By con
trast, traditional fraud and abuse statutes and insurance regulations usually do not
allow private rights of action for damages ( outside of the False Claims Act qui tam
context). See Bundren, supra note 48, at 164.
51. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 4-5, 8-9, 11 (West 1998); Bun
dren, supra note 48, at 164-65.
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"goods or services" in "trade or commerce," and not to "profes
sional services." The traditional theory behind such exclusions
is that professions such as medicine are regulated by other
means, most notably the professional licensure and disciplinary
structure. 52 Moreover, in an attempt to limit the reach of these
laws to activities that were not otherwise actionable under com
mon law tort and contract theories, legislators and courts often
restricted these laws to situations where the activities at issue
affected the public interest, and resulted (or had the potential to
result) in public injury.53
As the practice of medicine has increasingly grown to resem
ble that of a traditional business, however, legislative and judi
cial recognition of both the professional exclusion and the public
injury requirement have waned. For example, in 1990, the Illi
nois legislature amended the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act to abolish the public injury requirement;
a federal district court later relied on this amendment in holding
that the "business aspects" of medicine were not exempted from
the law.54 Similarly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has recog
nized that patients may have a private right of action against
physicians under the state's Consumer Fraud Act, provided they
can prove the existence of the requisite financial injury. 55 And
even where the actual practice of medicine by a physician re
mains exempted, courts have applied consumer protection stat
utes to health care business entities, including HMOs. In
Johnston v. Anchor Organization for Health Maintenance, for
example, the Illinois Appellate Court held that an HMO's mis
representations regarding the payment of a patient's bills (in
cluding a refusal to cover previously approved care,
concealment of eventual payment of the bill, and misrepresenta
tions that the patient still owed money) were actionable under
52. See, e.g., Bundren, supra note 48, at 141; OHio REv. Cooe ANN. § 1345.01
(Anderson 1998) (excluding dealings between physicians and patients from the defini
tion of "consumer transactions" covered by the Consumer Sales Practices Act).
53. See, e.g. Bundren, supra note 48, at 138-41.
54. See Gadson v. Newman, 807 F. Supp. 1412, 1415-18 (C.D. Ill. 1992). The
current version of the statute requires "[p]roof of a public injury, a pattern, or an
effect on consumers and the public interest" in actions against vehicle dealers, but is
silent regarding actions against others. See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/lOa(a) (West
1998).
55. See D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 172-73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (dis
missing Consumer Fraud Act claims by patients against physician previously con
victed of accepting kickbacks in connection with the prescription of a particular drug,
on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to allege the requisite injury).
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the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act. 56
In fact, the potential conflicts of interest inherent in many
managed care financial arrangements, combined with patients'
relative lack of power, would appear to warrant increased appli
cation of consumer protection statutes to MCOs.57 For patients,
however, the biggest obstacle to successful suits may continue to
be the federal law of ERISA. Federal courts have held that con
sumer protection statutes are preempted as applied to MCO en
rollees who receive health benefits from their employers
because the claims usually "relate to" employee benefit plans,
and the statutes cannot be "saved" as laws primarily regulating
the business of insurance. In Anderson v. Humana, for example,
the Seventh Circuit rejected a challenge under the Illinois Con
sumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act by an
ERISA plan participant who alleged that her HMO's incentive
structure perpetrated a fraud on consumers. 58 Finding that the
particular health plan information sought by the plaintiff would
require a revision of various plan documents, the court held that
the claim clearly "related to" the employee benefit plan. Apply
ing the traditional definition of the "business of insurance," the
court soundly rejected any argument that the consumer protec
tion statute was "saved" as a law regulating the business of
msurance:
Anderson invokes not a law regulating the methods of pooling
risks or the prices to be charged. Instead she contends that
Humana deceived consumers about the costs and benefits of
the choices open to them under ERISA plans. . . Anderson
relies on an all-purpose truth-in-business statute, applicable
primarily to used car salesmen and the promotional literature
for vacuum cleaners. It does not apply to insurance at all-not
directly, anyway.59
Because the plaintiff failed to argue that the HMO's actions
violated ERISA itself, the court upheld dismissal of the
complaint.60
56. See Johnson, 621 N.E.2d 137 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993).
57. See, e.g., Bundren, supra note 48, at 153-60 (arguing that HMOs are appropriate targets for consumer protection actions).
58. See Anderson, 24 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 1994).
59. Id. at 892.
60. See also Ryan, 921 F. Supp. at 38 (Massachusetts consumer protection statute
"clearly is not a state statute which regulates insurance"); McManus, 742 F. Supp. at
382 (Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act does not fall within ERISA's savings
clause). The Federal Employees Health Benefits Act also has been held to preempt
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In contrast, in Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut allowed a group of physicians who had
been removed from a managed care health network, as well as
their patients, to sue under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Prac
tices and Unfair Insurance Practices Acts.61 The court explained
that the plaintiffs' allegations in the case did not "relate to" the
employee benefit plan:
Rather than affecting or prescribing the establishment, admin
istration, regulation or maintenance of an employee benefit
plan, the plaintiffs' claims merely tum on requiring CIGNA to
enforce the benefit plan that it has already established and is
maintaining. . . . Neither class of plaintiffs is requesting that
CIGNA change the method by which it determines which phy
sicians will be providers under its plan-in other words, the
plaintiffs are not claiming that CIGNA should change its list of
criteria. Instead, the plaintiffs are merely asking that CIGNA
disclose its criteria and, subsequently, adhere to them.62

Because it found the claims did not "relate to" an employee
benefit plan, the court did not address the issue of whether the
consumer protection laws would fall within the savings clause.63
Thus, whether an action based on violation of state consumer
protection laws will be subject to ERISA preemption is likely to
depend on the substance of the underlying dispute. Despite the
potential pitfalls associated with the consumer protection priconsumer protection claims against HMOs by federal employees who receive medical
benefits through the government's employee benefits program. See, e.g., Negron v.
Patel, 6 F. Supp. 2d 366 (E.D. Pa. 1998). In many of the BRISA cases, the plaintiffs
have sought to rely on the consumer protection statute only after arguing unsuccess
fully for a private right of action under the relevant insurance regulations - which
presumably would fall within the savings clause. See, e.g., Anderson, 24 F.3d at 892
(no private right of action under insurance regulations tracking the Consumer Fraud
Act); Ryan, 921 F. Supp. at 38 (rejecting private right of action under insurance code).
61. See Napoletano, 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1106
(1997).
62. Id. at 143. Cf Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., No. 98 C 0422, 1998 WL
325204 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 1998) (remanding to state court plaintiffs suit for specific
performance by HMO under state law requiring HMOs to provide independent phy
sician review of medical necessity, on the grounds that it was not an ERISA"claim).
63. However, a federal district court had held two years earlier that a plaintiff's
claims under the same laws that her insurer improperly released her husband from a
treatment center, leading to his subsequent suicide, were preempted because they
were "based on the contention that defendant improperly administered her husband's
claim." See Bailey-Gates v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 890 F. Supp. 73, 77 (D. Conn. 1994).
The court went on to note that "it is well established in this district that ERISA's
savings clause does not except the [consumer protection] claims from preemption."
Id. at 79.
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vate right of action, it may remain a viable cause of action under
certain circumstances.
Moreover, consumer protection statutes offer a great deal of
flexibility to state attorneys general, who have crafted innova
tive settlements with health care entities. For example, even
before the enactment of the New York health insurer prompt
payment requirements, Attorney General Dennis Vacco in
voked the general consumer protection laws to investigate pay
ment delays by Oxford Health Plans, an investigation that
resulted in Oxford's agreement to pay interest on delayed claims
and to establish a schedule of timely payments. 64 Regardless of
whether these allegations would have prevailed in court, these
settlements demonstrate the significant power and flexibility of
consumer protection laws as applied to the health industry by
state regulators, and sound a cautionary note for future MCO
practices.
III.

THE ROLES OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL
GOVERNMENTS

Clearly, the states have a great deal of flexibility to address
improper activities by MCOs. Activities may be pursued as vio
lations of relevant insurance requirements, either general or
MCO-specific, which are likely to result in fines and agreements
to cease the improper behavior. Activities also may be ad
dressed through consumer protection actions, brought by the at
torney general or by individual MCO subscribers, resulting in
damages, fines, injunctive relief and restitution. In more egre
gious cases, when there is concrete evidence of an intent to de
fraud patients or payers, violators may be pursued through
traditional anti-fraud laws, potentially resulting in heavy fines or
penalties (including criminal liability). State regulators may
combine or choose among these options in tailoring settlements
64. See Oxford, supra note 41, at 753. Similarly, in the mid-1990s, there were sev
eral agreements between drug manufacturers and a consortium of state attorneys gen
eral that resulted in payment of substantial fines under state consumer protection
laws. In one of these cases, the manufacturer had instituted a program (without pa
tient knowledge) under which it offered to compensate pharmacists for "educating"
patients whom they convinced to switch to the manufacturers' newer products - al
legedly failing to provide for appropriate disclosure to consumers. See, e.g., In re
Upjohn Co., No. C?-94-7856, Order Approving Assurance of Discontinuance (Ram
sey Cty. Dist. Ct., Aug. 1, 1994) (settlement with Attorneys General in Minnesota,
Arizona, Iowa, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin) (copy on
file with author).
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or enforcement actions that target the specific activities
involved.
In contrast, the federal government appears to have fewer op
tions to address MCO activities. Unlike the states, the federal
government does not license health care professionals or enti
ties; it merely determines which state-licensed individuals and
entities will be permitted to receive payment for treating pa
tients under the various federal health care programs. 65 Accord
ingly, federal settlements tend to consist of repayment of
improperly received funds, payment of sizeable civil penalties or
criminal fines, the imposition of onerous procedures designed to
assure future compliance with program rules and, in the most
egregious cases, imprisonment or exclusion from participation in
all government-funded health plans.66 The opportunities to tai
lor a settlement to the specific allegations at issue, except per
haps by varying the amount of the penalty or the specific
conditions of the corporate integrity agreement, are limited.
This dual approach to MCO regulation may have a number of
unintended effects, particularly with respect to the characteriza
tion of government investigations. While improper activities in
the state context may be characterized as a mere "failure to
comply" with relevant insurance requirements, those under
taken in the context of federal health care programs are invaria
bly investigated, publicized, and denounced as outright "fraud."
As an example, consider two articles that appeared in the trade
press during the summer of 1998 regarding MCO failures to pay
claims in a timely manner. One article, appearing under the
heading "Claims Administration," described the New York At
torney General's desire to hear Aetna U.S. Healthcare's "side of
the story" and to negotiate a resolution regarding allegations of
delayed payment.67 Yet on the very next page, an article under
65. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 (providing that "[n]othing in [the Medicare law]
shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any super
vision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical serv
ices are provided"), 1395w-25(a) (requiring that all Medicare+Choice organizations
be licensed under state law as risk-bearing entities eligible to offer health insurance or
health benefits coverage, with the exception of certain provider-sponsored organiza
tions) (1998).
66. Settlements often result in the imposition of mandatory "corporate integrity
agreements" to assure future legal compliance. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Wagner v. Allied
Clin. Labs., No. C-1-94-092 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 20, 1995), reprinted in MEDICARE &
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) <JI 43,142.
67. See Claims Administration: New York Attorney General Seeks Talks on Aetna
U.S. Healthcare Payment Delays, 4 BNA's MANAGED CARE REP., Aug. 12, 1998, at
814.
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the heading "Fraud and Abuse" related comments made by an
Assistant U.S. Attorney and an F.B.I. supervisor, both of whom
indicated that the federal government would aggressively pursue
the same activity - MCO payment delays - under civil and
criminal anti-fraud laws.68
While the differences in characterization may be understanda
ble, this example certainly illustrates the confusing and some
what contradictory approaches taken at the federal and state
levels. It also raises the somewhat disturbing possibility that
whether or not an MCO is engaged in "fraud" depends not on
what the MCO is doing, but on who is investigating. More im
portantly, it raises the question of which approach better serves
MCO patients. Clearly, low quality MCOs, or those that engage
in truly fraudulent activities, should lose their ability to provide
services to patients - a result that can be achieved under either
the state or federal approaches. But what of the MCO that en
gages in less abusive practices, violating applicable requirements
without the risk of patient harm or threat of loss to government
programs? Patients of these entities would appear to be better
served by a regulatory settlement requiring the MCO to return
improperly paid funds, pay a reasonable fine, and cease the of
fensive activities, instead of requiring the organization to pay an
enormous penalty under the False Claims Act and threatening
the MCO with the possibility of criminal liability and/or exclu
sion. Thus, the flexibility available to state officials would ap
pear to better serve the interests of the patient population the
laws are designed to protect.
The federal government has begun to recognize the impor
tance of so-called "intermediate sanctions" providing for less
draconian remedies than termination of the MCO's ability to
serve Medicare and Medicaid patients. Since 1994, the OIG has
had the authority to suspend enrollment or payment and to im
pose moderate civil penalties on HMOs that engage in a variety
of improper activities, such as failing to provide medically neces
sary items and services, improperly disenrolling or refusing to
enroll beneficiaries, misrepresenting or falsifying information,
or failing to comply with prompt payment requirements.69 As
one author has noted, these intermediate sanctions were neces68. See Fraud and Abuse: MCOs Face Potential Criminal Actions for Claims Pay
ment Delays, Denials, 4 BNA's MANAGED CARE REP., Aug. 12; 1998, at 815.
69. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395mm(I)(6)(A), 1396b(m)(5)(A) (1998); 42 C.F.R.
§ 417.S00(a) (1997).
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sary because the Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA") previously had been "reluctant to impose th[e] ulti
mate sanction [of termination] because this could result in less
access to care for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. "70
These authorities have been augmented by additional (and con
troversial) requirements imposed on MCOs by the new Medi
care+Choice regulations, including requirements that the MCO
establish a compliance program, submit marketing materials for
approval, certify the accuracy of all encounter data, and adopt
specific types of grievance procedures.71
The ultimate effect of these new federal regulations is unclear.
To the extent that they impose new requirements on MCOs sim
ilar to those imposed under the traditional state insurance licen
sure process, they should allow the federal government more
flexibility in crafting settlements to better target specific im
proper MCO activities. However, to the extent that the new
regulations merely duplicate (or preempt) 72 existing state insur
ance requirements, they are likely to confuse the process even
more, and subject both MCOs and their patients to an even
more fragmented anti-fraud universe.
CONCLUSION

As this Article has argued, the states currently have a great
deal more flexibility than the federal government to pursue im
proper MCO activities under a variety of theories, ranging from
insurance regulation to traditional anti-fraud laws. This, in tum,
allows the states to craft targeted settlements to address poten
tial problems without interrupting patient access to care. There
are some indications that the federal government is attempting
to broaden its authority over more "regulatory" MCO viola
tions, potentially offering greater flexibility at the federal level
as well. However, the federal government still lags behind the
states in this respect. Yet regardless of whether the authority is
wielded by the federal government or by a state, the object of
70. See W. Bradley Tully, New Intermediate Sanctions are Bad News for Managed
Care, 9 HEALTHSPAN 15 (1994).
71. See 63 Fed. Reg. 34,968 (1998) (interim final rule with comment period). See
also 63 Fed. Reg. 52,022 (1998) (similar requirements contained in the proposed rule
allowing states greater flexibility to require Medicaid recipients to enroll in MCOs).
The breadth of the Medicare+Choice regulations has been controversial, however,
and it remains to be seen whether many of these requirements will be implemented.
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3) (1998) (Medicare+Choice standards supersede
inconsistent state laws or regulations).
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MCO anti-fraud efforts should be the same: to achieve an ap
propriate resolution of the problem without imposing costs so
great that they jeopardize the MCO's ability to provide quality
services to its patients. Or, in the immortal words of Gilbert and
Sullivan, the goal should be "to let the punishment fit the
crime."73

73. W.S. Gilbert, "The Mikado, or The Town .of Titipu," in
w.s. GILBERT 143-44 (1932).
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